# AI agent security incidents: breaches and exploits

> Dated tracker of security incidents that matter for AI agents and bots that touch money: breaches, exploits and security releases.

Canonical: https://tradingagentstack.com/incidents/

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# Incidents: security events for AI agents that touch money

Breaches, exploits and security releases that matter if you run a trading bot or give an AI agent access to a wallet or exchange key. One factual sentence each, from the official disclosure, newest first. Last update 2026-10-24. [RSS feed](https://tradingagentstack.com/incidents/rss.xml)

**How we use this list.** Only incidents with an official source (the vendor's own disclosure, advisory or security release) are added, and we only state amounts the official source states. When an incident names a listed tool, it shows on that tool's page and lowers the *incident record* input of its [Agent Risk Score](https://tradingagentstack.com/methodology/#agent-risk-score): an unresolved incident in the last 12 months scores 0 of 10, one resolved incident 5. The tracker started on October 23, 2026, so older incidents appear only once they are added with an official source.

## Under review: unconfirmed reports

Reports we are watching but cannot confirm yet. They are not in the list below and do not change any score. Each one moves to the list, with the official source, once the vendor or an official advisory confirms it.

- **2026-10-26** Unconfirmed Reports that wallets used with the Bloom trading bot were drained: about 9,408 SOL from 41 to 48 wallets moved to one address within a minute, each transfer signed with the owner's own key. Bloom says 49 wallets belonging to 9 users were affected, that it will fully reimburse those users to new wallets they choose, and that it is still investigating the root cause, including whether a third-party provider was compromised; earlier it said all other wallets remain safe and temporarily disabled some services. Bloom staff earlier pointed to another tool. [Check page](https://tradingagentstack.com/check/bloom/)
  - [Bloom (Oct 26, 10:46 PKT): 49 wallets belonging to 9 users](https://x.com/BloomTrading/status/2114594946304921868)

  - [Bloom (Oct 26, 09:37 PKT): full reimbursement, root cause still under investigation including a possible third-party compromise](https://x.com/BloomTrading/status/2114577183834280267)

  - [Bloom's statement (Oct 26, 08:02 PKT): investigating, other wallets safe, some services temporarily disabled](https://x.com/BloomTrading/status/2114553258337574985)

  - [Receiving address on Solscan (9,408.2 SOL, checked Oct 26, 2026 08:15 PKT)](https://solscan.io/account/7kY8qx8MqJ7Rz2vMhgHETdZLHcTp1oM78AA9dmE9p8BQ)

  - [iris_intel_app: 41 wallets in 51 seconds, all had traded through Bloom's router](https://x.com/iris_intel_app/status/2114535806396506307)

  - [insidecalls: 48 wallets, about $950K, all had used Bloom](https://x.com/insidecalls/status/2114547430020833446)

  - [Hiruzenaio: Bloom staff deny it and point to RapidLaunch](https://x.com/Hiruzenaio/status/2114536206755045594)

  - [domyxbt: a victim reports losing about $80K](https://x.com/domyxbt/status/2114529594942337103)

## October 24, 2026

- **2026-10-24** Incident Open / not stated as resolved Initia said a bug in MoveVM script caching let an attacker credit themselves unbacked WETH, iUSD and USDC and bridge about $2.7M out (via LayerZero and CCTP, swapped to 1,135.52 ETH) before it halted the L1 and its rollups; it said no native INIT was minted and that a fix was being written and audited. [Source](https://x.com/initia/status/2113915002008612945)

- **2026-10-24** Incident Open / not stated as resolved Keystone said a third party pulled customer shipping data (names, contact details, shipping addresses, items bought and prices) from its website store via the Shopify API, detected October 20 and confirmed October 23; it said payment details, recovery phrases, private keys and wallet passwords were not exposed, and warned of scammers posing as Keystone with refunds or replacement devices. [Source](https://x.com/KeystoneWallet/status/2114054080754770137)

## October 23, 2026

- **2026-10-23** Incident Open / not stated as resolved Electrum released 4.8.3 as a security update; press reports of its advisory say earlier versions let a malicious Electrum server plant a fake pending payment so that a later fee bump (RBF) paid the attacker, and that users of trusted servers were not exposed. Update to 4.8.3 or later. [Source](https://github.com/spesmilo/electrum/blob/4.8.3/RELEASE-NOTES)

## October 21, 2026

- **2026-10-21** Incident Open / not stated as resolved Railway disclosed that an unauthorized third party may have accessed encrypted environment variables and obtained the decrypted contents of some of them; it told users to immediately roll all environment variables and API keys stored in Railway and paused all deployments while it investigates. [Source](https://blog.railway.com/p/security-disclosure-wednesday-october-21st)

- **2026-10-21** Incident Open / not stated as resolved Microsoft reported that the China-state aligned actor Storm-0940 used ARTEX, an open-source multi-agent LLM penetration-testing framework, to automate scanning, password spraying and OAuth app abuse in a ConnectWise cloud backup supply-chain compromise aimed at hundreds of organizations. [Source](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/21/storm-0940-uses-artex-agentic-ai-connectwise-supply-chain-compromise/)

- **2026-10-21** Incident Resolved Node.js security releases v22.23.4, v24.22.1 and v26.12.1 fix ten vulnerabilities, including a high-severity Brotli decoder out-of-bounds write that permits remote code execution (CVE-2026-111497) in the 22.x, 24.x and 26.x lines. [Source](https://nodejs.org/en/blog/vulnerability/october-2026-security-releases)

## What to do when an incident hits a tool you use

Already lost funds? Follow [what to do if a bot or wallet is drained](https://tradingagentstack.com/trading-bot-drained-what-to-do/).

- Rotate any API key, secret or environment variable the affected service could read, starting with exchange keys that can trade.

- Check that trading keys have withdrawals off and are bound to your server's IP.

- Pause the agent until the vendor says the incident is contained.

6 incidents. All other dated changes are on [What's new](https://tradingagentstack.com/changes/). Spot an incident we missed, or a correction? [Send it in](https://tradingagentstack.com/submit/) with the official source.

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